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Abstract
Key transport protocols are designed to transfer a secret key from an initiating
principal to other entities in a network. The three-pass protocol is a key transport
protocol developed by Adi Shamir in 1980 where Alice wants to transport a secret
message to Bob over an insecure channel, and they do not have any pre-shared se-
cret information. In this paper, we prove the impossibility of secret key transporta-
tion from a principal to another entity in a network by using the three pass protocol
over public Abelian groups. If it were possible to employ public Abelian groups to
implement the three-pass protocol, we could use it in post-quantum cryptography
for transporting keys providing information theoretic security without relying on
any computationally difficult problem.
1 Introduction
Confidentiality in secure communications is defined as ensuring that an adversary gains
no intelligence from a sent message. Alice and Bob would like to communicate with
each other. However, they do not share any secrets. They only share the endpoints
of a communication channel that is fast, albeit insecure. Anything put on the channel
may be tapped by a passive eavesdropper, Eve. We assume there is no active attacker
(e.g., Mallory) in the system when Alice and Bob talk to each other; i.e., active attacks
such as the man in the middle attack is out of the scope of the paper. Is it possible
for Alice and Bob to exchange messages in a confidentialmanner without having pre-
shared secrets (keys)? The answer to this question falls in the scope of key transport or
agreement protocols over insecure channels.
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Key transport protocols are designed to transfer a secret key from an initiating
principal to another entity in a network. The initiator determines the key. However,
all of the principals taking part in the protocol influence the key establishment process
in key agreement protocols. There are many key agreement protocols proposed in
the literature that rely on computationally difficult problems (or in general public-key
systems). The hallmark is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol that makes use
of the difficulty of discrete logarithm problem over a Galois field [1]. It is widely
employed for exchanging secret keys on the Internet [2]. Additionally, Ko-Lee-Cheon-
Han-Kang-Park [3] and Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld [4] key agreement protocols rely on
the computationally difficult conjugacy problem [5].
The three-pass protocol, also known as Shamir’s no-key protocol (protocol 12.22 in
[6]), is a key transport protocol developed by Adi Shamir in 1980 where Alice wants to
transport a secret messagem to Bob over an insecure channel, and they do not share any
secret information. They have mutually agreed on a symmetric encryption scheme that
is a pair of encryption and decryption algorithms (E,D) acting on a message spaceM
(where |M| > 1) and a key space K such that for all messages m ∈M and keys k ∈ K,
Prob {Dk(Ek(m) = m} = 1 where Ek(m) is the notation for encryption of message m
with key k. Both Alice and Bob determine their secret keys ka and kb respectively
without sharing with each other. Alice encrypts m with her secret key ka and sends
c1 = Eka (m) to Bob. Bob does not have any idea about ka, therefore, cannot possibly
decrypt c1. Bob sends back to Alice c2 = Ekb (c1). If E and D commutes, Alice can
produce c3 = Dka (c2) = Ekb (m) and send it to Bob. Finally, Bob can decrypt it and
retrieve the secret message m.
If it were possible to employ public Abelian groups to implement the three-pass
protocol as we present in Section 2, we could use it in post-quantum cryptography
for transporting keys providing information theoretic security without relying on any
computationally difficult problem. As the main contribution of this work, we prove
in Section 3 that it is impossible to communicate without sharing secrets using three-
pass protocol over public Abelian groups. We draw the conclusion in Section 4 that
one has to rely on computational security instead of information-theoretic security to
implement the three-pass protocol.
2 Three Pass Protocol Using Abelian Groups
Let (G,∗) be an Abelian group acting on a set S. We apply three-pass protocol using
the action of G on S. If there exists a group homomorphism
ϕ : G→ Sym(S)
g→ ϕg
where Sym(S) is the group of all permutations on the set S under composition, then we
say that G acts on S. Here, the map ϕ is called the permutation representation of G on
S. To simplify the notation, we prefer to use the right action notation a ◦g to represent
ϕg(a). Note that a group action satisfies a ◦ (g ∗ h) = (a ◦g) ◦ h and a ◦1 = a, where 1 is
the identity element of G. Encryption is defined as the group action.
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Alice Bob
Pick k ∈ S
and g ∈G
Pick h ∈G
c1 = k ◦g
c2 = c1 ◦ h
c3 = c2 ◦g
−1
Compute
k = c3 ◦h
−1
Figure 1: Three-pass protocol using public Abelian group actions.
We assume that Alice and Bob have agreed on the public Abelian group G and the
public homomorphism ϕ. Notice that, G and ϕ have to be public since the three-pass
protocol assumes no pre-shared information. As shown in Fig.1, Alice selects the to-
be-transported secret key k ∈ S and a private group element g ∈ G uniform randomly,
sends Bob c1 = k ◦ g. Notice here that this operation is the encryption of the secret
message k using the group action g (i.e., c1 = Eg(k)). Bob selects his private group
element h ∈ G uniform randomly and sends back to Alice c2 = c1 ◦ h. Then, Alice
computes c3 = c2 ◦ g
−1
. Following the properties of group actions c3 = ((k ◦ g) ◦ h) ◦
g
−1
= k ◦ (g ∗ h ∗g−1). Since we chose an Abelian group, c3 = k ◦ (g ∗g
−1 ∗ h) = k ◦ (1∗
h)= k ◦h. In this protocol, all the messages conveyed over the channel, c1, c2, c3 ∈C = S
are encrypted. At the end of these three exchange of messages, Bob is able to secretly
compute the key k by (k ◦ h) ◦ h−1 = k ◦1 = k.
2.1 Requirements of the Public Group G
G has to satisfy the following properties.
Property 1. Commutativity: The group G must be Abelian. If G is not Abelian, then
c3 need not to be equal to k ◦ h.
Property 2. Uniform Randomness: Let C, S and G be the random variables denoting
the values of ciphertexts (e.g., c1, c2 or c3 or any c ∈ C), secret keys to be transport
(e.g., k ∈ S) and group elements (e.g., g, h ∈ G), respectively. To be able to provide
information theoretic security, uniform randomness must be satisfied, i.e.,
Prob {C = c |S = k,G = g} = Prob {C = c |S = k,G = h}
and
Prob {C = c |S = k0,G = g} = Prob {C = c |S = k1,G = g}
providing computational indistinguishability for any probability distribution over the
set S, the groupG and ciphertext space C = S where Prob {C = c} > 0. Here, we claim
that the probability of conveying any ciphertext over the channel in this protocol is
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equally likely. Therefore, eavesdropping does not give any statistical advantage to an
the attacker, i.e.,
Prob {S = k |C = c} = Prob {S = k} .
We select the to-be-transported secret key k ∈ S and a private group element g ∈ G
shown in Fig. 1 uniform randomly to satisfy Property 2. Furthermore, for any pair
(a,b) ∈ S×S, there must be exactlyM > 1 group elements sending1 a to b. In particular,
this action must be transitive as defined in Appendix 5.3.
2.2 An Easy Example Implementation
An easy example is to use the natural action of Klein four-group V . Klein four-group
is a well-known Abelian permutation group on S = {1,2,3,4} whose non-identity el-
ements has order two. That is, every element is its own inverse. It is a subgroup of
Sym(S). For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we present V using the two-row nota-
tion where images are given in the second row of τ =
(
1 2 3 4
τ(1) τ(2) τ(3) τ(4)
)
. The
Klein four-group is V = {τ0, τ1,τ2, τ3} where τ0 =
(
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
)
, τ1 =
(
1 2 3 4
2 1 4 3
)
,
τ2 =
(
1 2 3 4
3 4 1 2
)
, and τ3 =
(
1 2 3 4
4 3 2 1
)
.
The implementation of the three-pass protocol using V is as follows. Alice and
Bob will employ V . Suppose Alice selects k = 3 as the secret key and her private
group element g = τ1 uniform randomly. She sends Bob c1 = 3 ◦ τ1 = 4. Suppose Bob
selects his private group element h = τ2 uniform randomly as well. Then, he sends back
c2 = 4◦τ2 = 2. Alice computes c3 = 2◦τ
−1
1
= 2◦τ1 = 1 and sends it to Bob. Finally, Bob
recovers the secret key by k = 1 ◦ τ−1
2
= 1 ◦ τ2 = 3, which is the secret key determined
by Alice following some probability distribution.
V satisfies both Property 1 and Property 2. Any message c1, c2 or c3 put on the
insecure channel is encrypted. Therefore, the readermay initially think it is not possible
for Eve to recover the key k. However, this implementation is prone to brute-force
attacks. Therefore an additional requirement is imposed on the order of G:
Property 3. Large Order: Trivially, the order of the group G and the cardinality of S
must be very large to make the brute force attack almost infeasible. A brute-force attack
can be (theoretically) used against any cryptosystem to find out the secrets. In this
protocol, the private key is an element of the selected group G. Hence, the probability
that an attacker successfully finds the correct element of the group G is equal to 1/|G |.
We present in the sequel that a much deeper security flaw resides in such imple-
mentations of the three-pass protocol even if we can find a G that satisfies all these
three properties.
1When we say g sends a to b, we mean b = a ◦g.
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3 Public Commutative Groups and Impossibility
When Eve observes c1 = 4 and c2 = 2 in the above example, she immediately finds out
Bob’s private group element h = τ2, since there is only one element τ in V sending a
to b for any pair of elements (a,b) ∈ S× S. It is computationally easy to determine τ
in V when a and b are given as in the three-pass protocol. In fact, this security flaw
is valid for any publicly known transitive Abelian group G even when the order of
G is very large and even when there exist many distinct group elements sending a to
b. Determining one group element sending a to b is enough to break the system and
determine the secret group elements g, h ∈ G and the secret key k to be transported
shown in Fig. 1.
One may get this result as follows. Let G be an Abelian group acting transitively
on S via a homomorphism ϕ : G → Sym(S). Take any a,b in S. Suppose that there
exist two distinct group elements g1,g2 sending a to b. Then g1 ∗ g
−1
2
is in the point
stabilizer of a (see Appendix 5.2). To put it plainly, let a ◦ g1 = b = a ◦ g2. Then
a ◦ (g1 ∗ g
−1
2
) = (a ◦ g1) ◦ g
−1
2
= b ◦ g−1
2
= a. Therefore, g1 ∗ g
−1
2
is an element of Ga.
Say g1 = α ∗ g2 for some α ∈ Ga. Now consider the kernel (see Appendix 5.1) of the
permutation representation ϕ, which is Kerϕ =
⋂
x∈SGx . Take any element x ∈ S.
Since, G is transitive on S, there exists an element r ∈ G such that x = a ◦ r. Then by
Theorem 1.4A-ii in [7] presented in Appendix 5.4, Gx = r
−1 ∗Ga ∗ r . As G is Abelian,
we getGx = r
−1 ∗Ga ∗r = r
−1 ∗r ∗Ga =Ga for all x and so Kerϕ =Ga. Hence ϕ(g1) =
ϕ(α ∗ g2) = ϕ(g2). For the convenience of the reader, let us verify the last equality
elementwise; x ◦g1 = (a ◦ r) ◦ (α ∗g2) = a ◦ (r ∗α ∗g2) = a ◦ (α ∗ r ∗g2) = (a ◦ r) ◦g2 =
x ◦ g2 since a ◦α = a. That is for any pair a,b in S, there may be two distinct group
elements sending a to b but in fact the corresponding permutation is unique.
Let’s relax the assumptions and consider that the above action of the groupG on the
set S is not transitive. In this case, we cannot satisfy Property 2 since Prob {C = c} = 0
for some ciphertext c. Even if we do not get the equality ϕ(g1) = ϕ(g2) for the elements
satisfying a ◦g1 = b = a ◦g2 the security flaw still exists.
Note that the equality g1 = α∗g2 for some α ∈Ga holds whenever a◦g1 = b= a◦g2.
As a consequence of this equality, it will be sufficient for the attacker to find any g that
satisfies a ◦ g = b instead of trying to find the selected private group element. In the
three pass-protocol, Alice selects a secret key k ∈ S and a private group element g ∈ G,
sends Bob c1 = k ◦g. Then Bob selects his private group element h and sends back to
Alice c2 = c1 ◦ h. Suppose Eve finds a group element h
′ satisfying c1 ◦ h
′
= c2. Then
h′ = α∗h for some α ∈Gc1 .When Alice sends c3 = (c1 ◦h)◦g
−1, Eve is able to recover
the secret key by computing c3 ◦ (h
′)−1. Indeed, c3 ◦ (h
′)−1 = ((c1 ◦ h) ◦g
−1) ◦ (h′)−1 =
c1 ◦ (h ∗ g
−1 ∗ (h′)−1) = c1 ◦ (h ∗ g
−1 ∗ (α ∗ h)−1) = c1 ◦ (h ∗ g
−1 ∗ h−1 ∗ α−1) = c1 ◦ (h ∗
g
−1 ∗ h−1 ∗α−1). Note that α−1 ∈ Gc1 as α ∈ Gc1 . Since the group is Abelian, one has
c3 ◦ (h
′)−1 = c1 ◦ (α
−1 ∗ g−1 ∗ h ∗ h−1) = (c1 ◦α
−1) ◦ g−1 = c1 ◦ g
−1
= k. Therefore, the
three-pass protocol is insecure when public Abelian groups are employed.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we prove the three-pass protocol is insecure when public Abelian groups
are employed. We consider using Abelian groups since the principals’ operations have
to be commutative for the three-pass protocol to work. The group has to also be public
since the principals should not have any secret prior to communication. When we as-
sume they have some shared secret information (e.g., an agreement on a secret Abelian
group), the innovative feature of the three-pass protocol -being able to establish a se-
cure channel without sharing any secret information in advance - becomes nonsensical.
Under these assumptions, it is impossible to securely transport a shared secret by em-
ploying the three-pass protocol over public Abelian groups. One has to rely on compu-
tational security instead of information-theoretic security to implement the three-pass
protocol as we encounter in many practical key exchange protocols such as the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol that relies on the discrete logarithm problem.
5 Appendices
5.1 Kernel of Group Homomorphism
Let ϕ : G→ H be a group homomorphism. Then the set Ker(ϕ) = {x ∈ G : ϕ(x) = 1H }
is called the kernel of ϕ.
5.2 Stabilizer of a Point
Let G be a group acting on a set S and let a be an element of S. The set of elements in
G which fix a is called the stabilizer of a in G and it is denoted by Ga .
5.3 Transitive Action
A groupG acting on a set S is said to be transitive if for any pair of elements a,b ∈ S,
there exists x ∈ G such that a ◦ x = b.
5.4 Theorem 1.4A-ii in [7]
Suppose that (G,∗) is a group acting on a set S and that r ∈ G and a, x ∈ S. Then, the
stabilizer Ga is a subgroup of G and Gx = r
−1 ∗Ga ∗ r whenever x = a ◦ r.
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